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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 
THE PROBLEM 
To assess current Chinese Communist economic difficulties, with special reference 
to the food situation, and to estimate their economic and political consequences: (a) 
over the next few years, and (b) in the event 1961 should prove a poor crop year. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Chinese Communist regime is now 
facing the most serious economic diffi-
culties it has confronted since it consoli-
dated its power over mainland China. As 
a result of economic mismanagement, 
and, especially, of two years of unfavor-
able weather, food production in 1960 was 
little if any larger than in 1957-at which 
time there were about 50 million fewer 
Chinese to feed. Widespread famine does 
not appear to be at hand, but in some 
provinces many people are now on a bare 
subsistence diet and the bitterest suffer-
ing lies immediately ahead in the period 
before the June harvests. The disloca-
tions caused by the "Leap Forward" and 
the removal of Soviet technicians have 
disrupted China's industrialization pro-
gram. These difficulties have sharply re-
duced the rate of economic growth during 
1960 and have created a serious balance 
of payments problem. Public morale, 
especially in rural areas, is almost cer-
tainly at its lowest point since the Com-
munists assumed power, and there have 
been some instances of open dissidence. 
(Paras. 7-25) 
2. The Chinese Communist regime has 
responded by giving agriculture a higher 
priority, dropping the "Leap Forward" 
approach in industry, and relaxing some-
what the economic demands on the 
people. Perhaps the best indicator of the 
severity of the food shortage has been 
Peiping's action in scheduling the impor-
tation of nearly three million tons of food-
grains during 1961, at a cost of about 
$200 million of Communist China's lim-
ited foreign currency holdings. (Paras. 
26-30) 
3. While normal crop weather in 1961 
would significantly improve farm output 
over the levels of 1959 and 1960, at least 
two years of average or better harvests 
will be required to overcome the crisis and 
permit a restoration of the diet to toler-
able levels, some rebuilding of domestic 
stocks, and the resumption of net food ex-
ports. If Soviet technicians in large 
numbers do not return to China, indus-
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trial production is likely to increase about 
12 percent annually, as compared with 
about 33 percent in 1959 and 16 percent 
in 1960. (Paras. 31-35) 
4. If 1961 is another poor crop year the 
economic and political effects for Com-
munist China are likely to be grave. 
There probably would be no increase in 
gross national product (GNP) in 1961, 
and growth prospects for later years 
would also be affected. Unless there were 
substantial food imports, malnutrition 
and disease would become widespread, 
and a considerable amount of starvation 
probably would occur. Public disaffec-
tion probably would become a major prob-
lem for the regime, perhaps forcing it to 
2 
undertake a massive campaign of threats 
and terror. It is unlikely even in these 
circumstances, however, that public dis-
affection could threaten continued con-
trol of China by its present leadership. 
(Paras. 38-40) 
5. We do not believe that Peiping would 
accept food offers from the US even under 
conditions of widespread famine. (Para. 
42) 
6. We do not believe that even famine 
conditions would, in themselves, cause 
Pei ping to engage in direct military 
aggression. Such difficulties probably 
would, however, prompt Peiping to avoid 
actions which would exacerbate its rela-
tions with Moscow. (Paras. 40-41) 
DISCUSSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
7. The Chinese Communist regime is now fac-
ing the most serious economic difficulties it 
has encountered since 1949-1950. As a result 
of two successive years of poor harvests, the 
withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the dis-
locations created by the "Leap Forward," the 
Chinese leaders have been forced sharply to 
slow down the pace of the country's econom-
ic development program.1 The most acute 
of these problems is the food shortage: the 
output of grain in 1960 has dropped to about 
the 1957 level, when there were an estimated 
50 million fewer Chinese to feed. This situa-
tion has increased popular disc on tent and 
apathy and weakened party morale. 
1 Evidence which has come to light on these 
matters since the publication of NIE 13-60, "Com-
munist China," dated 6 December 1960, necessitate 
a lowering of the rates of growth made in that 
paper. 
II. COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC 
DIFFICULTIES 
The Agricultural Crisis 
8. Peiping's orthodox Communist program for 
economic development has been based on the 
belief that China could be industrialized rap-
idly, despite its technological backwardness 
and the unfavorable ratio of population to 
arable land. Consumption was to be held in 
check and industrial plant was to be built 
up with technical assistance and large-scale 
imports of machinery from the USSR. Ag-
riculture, which had the threefold task of: 
(a) feeding a fast-growing population; (b) 
supplying increasing quantities of raw mate-
rials to industry; and (c) providing goods for 
export, was to rely primarily on labor-inten-
sive projects and programs. The moderniza-
tion of agriculture was to wait until industry 
developed enough to provide simultaneously 
the resources for further industrial growth 
and for increased investment in agriculture. 
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This program involved a deliberate gamble 
that the thin margin between the production 
of food and the minimum needs of the popu-
lation could be maintained. There are grow-
ing indications that Chinese leaders now real-
ize that this gamble has not succeeded. 
9. Agricultural production, which had barely 
kept ahead of population growth until the 
past two years, has now dropped behind. The 
situation has become especially acute as re-
gards foodgrains, which make up 85-90 per-
cent of the Chinese diet. Although foodgrain 
production increased by an estimated 10 per-
cent-from 168 to 185 million metric tons 2-
during China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-
1957), this was more than offset by the esti-
mated 12 percent population increase, and 
only a slightly more rapid growth of other 
foods made possible a small improvement in 
the people's diet. 3 The situation was tem-
porarily eased by a bumper crop in 1958, when 
foodgrain production reached an estimated 
212 million tons. During late 1958, however, 
the regime allowed food to be consumed 
through free supply in the commune mess-
2 All figures on grain production are in metric 
tons of unhusked grain, and include the grain 
equivalent of tubers. 
"The statistics used in this SNIE for agricultural 
and industrial production are only approximations. 
The Chinese Communists have made it difficult for 
foreign observers to use official data in gaining a 
clear understanding of the workings of the econ-
omy. At the present time, moreover, there is much 
less official information than would ordinarily be 
available on 1960 performance and the 1961 plan. 
Official statements about economic trends in 1960 
and early 1961, however, tacitly support the general 
conclusions of this SNIE. Official statements have 
hinted that production of basic food crops was close 
to the level of production in 1957. With the excep-
tion of a few industrial commodities, industrial out-
put is admitted to have fallen short of the 1960 
targets. 
The population figures used in this estimate are 
based on the official census figures for 1953 together 
with scattered official data on birth rates and death 
rates, and with comparisons with similar Asian 
cultures. 
Although the scarcity of data for 1960 precludes 
making precise estimates of population, production 
of food crops, and production of many important 
industrial commodities, the data are believed ade-
quate to support the year-by-year trends and gen-
eral conclusions of this SNIE. 
halls at a rate that it could not sustain. By 
early 1959 food reserves were already low and 
local shortages had appeared in many areas 
of the country. 
10. Since 1958 the problem has been greatly 
intensified by two consecutive poor crop years. 
Foodgrain production in 1959 declined to an 
estimated 190 million tons, and the 1960 har-
vest is estimated to have been only 180-190 
million tons. Moreover, the quality of the 
Chinese diet has declined: consumption of 
foods rich in nutrients, such as meat, vege-
table oils, and soybean products, has fallen. 
Thus, a very low per capita caloric intake has 
been sustained for nearly two years despite 
the heavy labor demands on the Chinese 
people. 
11. Widespread famine does not appear to be 
at hand, but in some provinces many people 
are now on a bare subsistence diet and the 
bitterest suffering lies immediately ahead in 
the period before June, when the first 1961 
crops will be harvested. Serious diseases of 
malnutrition, such as beri-beri and nutritional 
edema, are widespread in the worst hit areas 
of the country. In addition, the lack of food 
has increased the incidence of other types of 
diseases, such as tuberculosis and liver trou-
ble. Many workers apparently are so weak-
ened by lack of food that normal workloads 
cannot be performed. 
12. Although firm information is lacking, non-
food crops also experienced a poor year in 
1960. The important cotton crop is estimated 
to have been less than in 1959, temporarily 
halting growth in the textile industry and 
bringing on an even stricter rationing of cot-
ton cloth. Production of oil-seeds and soy-
beans in 1960 probably was no higher than 
in 1959 and may have been somewhat lower. 
13. The recent failures of Chinese agriculture 
have been due principally to adverse weather 
conditions. It is clear that 1959 and 1960 
were years of severe natural disasters in 
China. In 1960, most of the major wheat 
growing areas in North China were affected by 
severe and extended drought. In rice grow-
ing areas of the Yangtze Valley and South 
China weather was average in 1960, and rice 
- SEC!tE'f 
~BCftEI' 4 
production was about the same as in 1959. 
However, some areas in the south were sub-
jected to typhoons and floods which caused 
severe local rice shortages. 
14. Bad as the weather was in 1959 and 1960, 
the regime appears to have been deliberately 
exaggerating the scope of weather difficulties 
in order to shift blame from itself. Some of 
the agricultural difficulties of the past two 
years have resulted from excesses and mis-
management attending the "Leap Forward" 
and the commune programs: the disruptive 
effects of commune reorganizations, vacillat-
ing policies with respect to private plots and 
private livestock holdings, the drive to grow 
more on less land, and agricultural innova-
tions that ignored practical experience and 
could not be quickly assimilated under vary-
ing local conditions. 
15. Peasant fatigue and apathy have also 
played a part. The people have been over-
worked for three years, their lives regimented, 
and they have been forced to do much work 
which they have felt was wasted. Finally, 
there have been no material rewards to com-
pensate for the extra demands placed on them 
by the regime. 
Sino-Soviet Economic Relations 
16. The deterioration of political relations be-
tween Communist China and the USSR dur-
ing 1960 further compounded Peiping's eco-
nomic difficulties. In July-August the USSR 
abruptly withdrew all or nearly all of the 
2,000 to 3,000 Soviet industrial technicians in 
Communist China. The removal of these 
technicians has retarded the schedules for 
the installation of equipment and the opening 
of some new plants, and probably has caused 
the temporary cancellation of other projects. 
17. The withdrawal of technicians has been 
the major economic sanction applied by Mos-
cow during the period of China's open chal-
lenge to Soviet authority in the Bloc. China's 
short-term indebtedness to the USSR during 
1960 increased by nearly $250 million, one of 
several indications that the USSR did not ex-
tend its economic pressure to the point of cur-
tailing the general flow of commodities to 
China. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the 
technicians and the cooling of political rela-
tions probably caused some disruption in Sino-
Soviet trade. 
18. The explanation for the shortages of pe-
troleum products in late 1960 is unclear. 
These shortages have affected aircraft and 
military activities, truck distribution of food, 
and passenger transport in major cities. 
In previous years the USSR acted quickly to 
make supplementary deliveries of petroleum 
products when the shipments provided for in 
the annual trade agreement were not suffi-
cient to last through the year. No supple-
men tary supplies were forthcoming in 1960, 
although current deliveries are apparently 
normal. The shortage in late 1960 may have 
been due to Chinese reluctance to request 
supplementary supplies at a time of political 
tension and trade difficulties, or the Chinese 
may have sought additional supplies but were 
turned down by the USSR. 
Demise of the "Leap Forward" 
19. During 1960 it became increasingly ap-
parent that the "Leap Forward" was in fact 
ending and that Peiping recognized it could 
not continue the breakneck industrialization 
tempo of 1958-1959. Since 1958 men and ma-
chines had been driven at an exhausting pace 
with only secondary concern for cost, quality, 
and variety of output, maintenance of equip-
ment, or morale of workers and party cadres. 
Trying to go too fast with too little, the re-
gime had been unable to maintain balance in 
the economy. Machines were built without 
spare parts and factories were constructed 
without adequate transportation facilities. 
The size and scope of many construction proj-
ects were extended at local initiative without 
coordination with national plans. By mid-
1960 abnormal numbers of machines were 
breaking down, many irrigation projects were 
ineffective, inventories of products of little 
economic use were mounting, and the people 
were becoming unable to maintain the frantic 
pace of the previous two years. 
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Economic and Political Effects of These Diffi-
culties 
20. The combined effect of two poor harvests, 
the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the 
failures of the "Leap Forward" has been 
sharply to reduce Communist China's rate of 
economic growth. Gross national product 
(GNP), which increased by about 18 percent 
in 1958 and 12 percent in 1959, is estimated to 
have increased by about 8 percent in 1960-
approximately the average rate of increase 
during the First Five-Year Plan.4 Output of 
crude steel, coal, and electric power apparently 
reached planned levels. However, industrial 
production increased by an estimated 16 per-
cent against a planned increase of about 25 
percent, and light industry registered little if 
any advance. Industries requiring a high 
level of technical skill, such as military in-
dustries, aircraft, shipbuilding, and atomic 
energy, probably encountered difficulties as a 
result of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. 
Total investment is estimated to have re-
mained at about the 1959 level, but invest-
ment in the industrial sector may have de-
clined. 
21. During the past three years Communist 
China has also encountered growing balance 
of payments problems. These problems-
which arose out of the increased imports 
needed to support the attempted "Leap For-
ward" industrialization program and out of 
the necessity to cut back food exports-had 
their heaviest impact in 1960. The agricul-
tural shortages probably caused total exports 
in the last half of 1960 to decline substantially. 
By the end of 1960, Communist China had ac-
cumulated a short-term indebtedness to other 
Bloc countries amounting to about $600 mil-
lion, over half of which had been incurred 
in 1960. In addition, reserves of gold and 
convertible currencies were reduced by nearly 
$200 million in 1959-1960. 
'Prices of capital goods-the fastest growing sec-
tor of the economy-in China, where capital is 
scarce in comparison to labor, are high compared 
to prices of capital goods in the US. If they were 
valued in terms of the US price structure, the rate 
of growth of GNP would be slightly lower. 
22. Less tangible but equally important have 
been the political repercussions of China's 
economic difficulties. Despite three years of 
tremendous effort, the Chinese people face 
greater personal hardships today than when 
the "Leap Forward" with its grandiose prom-
ises began. Traditionally the Chinese have 
accepted hardship with considerable stoicism, 
and many older people, recalling mass star-
vation in the past, may credit the regime with 
preventing the situation from as yet deterio-
rating that far. However, under the com-
mune system the Chinese state, rather than 
the family, has assumed the responsibility 
for providing food, and most Chinese prob-
ably place on the state the onus of respon-
sibility for their present plight. 
23. Moreover, the present food difficulties 
come atop vast social changes, exhausting 
labor pressures, policy vacillations, and un-
fulfilled promises. Present evidence sug-
gests that large sections of the populace are 
disillusioned and apathetic and that con-
fidence in the regime's policies has been 
badly shaken. Public morale, particularly in 
rural areas, is almost certainly at its lowest 
point since the Communists assumed power. 
Disaffection has in at least some instances 
taken the form of open dissidence, such as 
the appearance of antiregime wall posters, 
attacks on cadres, food riots, and various 
forms of sabotage of production. Neverthe-
less, we do not believe that widespread or or-
ganized efforts at rebellion or open rejection 
of the regime's authority are likely in the near 
future. 
24. There is no indication that China's diffi-
culties have caused the development of either 
severe factionalism within the leadership 
group or a challenge to Mao, although there 
almost certainly have been serious policy dis-
agreements within the party. There is cred-
ible evidence that morale within the party 
has been shaken. The cadres have had to 
cope with the conflicting pressures of party 
orders, popular attitudes, and the often prac-
tical impossibilities of the given situation. 
Their task has been complicated by the 
problem of interpreting and implementing 
shifting policies without incurring subsequent 
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condemnation for "rightist" or "leftist" er-
rors. The cadres probably are particularly 
resentful of the leadership's attempt to blame 
its failures on them. While the party almost 
certainly continues to be generally effective in 
maintaining order and discipline, we believe 
that its responses to the leadership are more 
sluggish and ill-coordinated. 
25. Little is known about the attitudes of the 
regular military and public security forces. 
They have probably experienced some hard-
ship along with the populace, even though 
they still receive preferential treatment. 
There have been reports of active discontent 
here and there among the security forces, but 
we have no basis for interpreting these reports 
as typical of the attitude of the security forces 
in general, much less that of the regular mili-
tary forces. 
Ill. THE REGIME'S REMEDIAL EFFORTS 
26. The concern of Chinese Communist lead-
ers over the food situation has been reflected 
in the emergency measures they have taken. 
Their major effort has been the adoption of 
a more rigorous rationing program both to 
equalize consumption throughout the country 
and to make sure that the limited food avail-
able is not consumed before the 1961 harvest. 5 
A cut in foodgrain rations averaging about 10 
percent has been decreed to stretch available 
food supplies until the June harvests. Leaves 
have been ordered stripped from trees to be fed 
to animals so that food normally eaten by 
animals can be consumed by humans. The 
peasants have been permitted to have private 
plots once again, free markets have been al-
lowed in at least some areas, and further 
modifications of the commune system have 
taken place. Regulations restricting food 
parcels from Hong Kong have been eased. 
27. In addition to its efforts to stretch avail-
able supplies, the regime has taken steps to 
reduce the effects of the shortages. Medical 
;; While it is difficult for the regime to transfer 
grain from the rice-eating south to the wheat-eating 
north, it does have some room for maneuverability 
since rice can be substituted for wheat in central 
China, where both types of grain are consumed. 
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survey teams have been organized to check 
on malnutrition, and extra rations have been 
provided for the worst cases. In addition, 
Peiping has ordered the mobilization of all 
medical forces to fight an increase in infec-
tious diseases expected this spring. The re-
gime has also introduced measures to con-
serve the energies of the population, such as 
the elimination of many political meetings, 
the provision of extra rest days, and a suspen-
sion of organized sports. Extensive as these 
measures are, they appear to reflect grim 
determination rather than desperation on the 
part of the regime. 
28. The most dramatic step taken by the re-
gime-and perhaps the best indicator of the 
severity of the food shortage-is Peiping's de-
cision to import several million tons of food-
grains. Under contracts already completed, 
imports of grain into China in 1961 will be 
nearly three million tons, most of which is 
scheduled for shipment in the first half of 
the year. The Chinese Communists are fur-
ther negotiating for additional quantities of 
Australian and Canadian wheat-possibly up 
to two million tons-and for Argentine corn-
several hundred thousand tons-probably to 
be supplied in the second half of 1961. These 
imports are in sharp contrast to Communist 
China's normal trade pattern of net exports 
of over one million tons of grain. The fol-
lowing table illustrates this shift: 
Metric Tons 
1959 1961 
MAJOR GRAIN IMPORTS (all 
from non-Bloc countries) 
Wheat (from Australia 
and Canada) . . . . . . . 53,500 
Barley (from Australia 
and Canada) 
Rice (from Burma) 3,500 
Rice (from Malaya) 7,000 
Total Imports of 
Grain . . 64,000 
ESTIMATED GRAIN EXPORTS: 
To Bloc countries . . 816,000 
To non-Bloc countries . . 838,000 
Total Exports of 









Estimated Net Exports ( +) 
or Net Imports (- ) + 1,590,000 -2,210,000 
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29. Agricultural exports have been the re-
gime's chief means of paying for the imports 
necessary for its industrialization program. 
Imports of the amounts contracted for to 
date-which are to be paid for in cash-will 
cost Peiping about $200 million, and if nego-
tiations now underway for additional grain 
are successful, total foodgrain imports in 
1961 will cost over $300 million. Whether or 
not the USSR has provided assistance to Pei-
ping for these purchases is unknown. In any 
event, Peiping has increased its sales of silver 
bullion and has secured limited short-term 
credits from Hong Kong banks. In addition, 
it is seeking a six-month credit from Australia 
to cover future purchases. These measures 
will provide only a small part of the foreign 
exchange needed, however, and the major part 
will have to come from a cutback of indus-
trial imports and a reduction of foreign ex-
change reserves, which, including gold, were 
estimated at only $225-350 million at the end 
of 1960. 
30. Peiping is also reorienting its domestic 
economic policies in an attempt to overcome 
the dislocations caused by the demise of the 
"Leap Forward" and the withdrawal of Soviet 
specialists. Although no details concerning a 
revised economic plan have been made public, 
statements on industrial policy indicate that 
scheduled rates of growth have been sharply 
reduced. The main effort in industrial con-
struction for the next two or three years is 
apparently to be directed toward completing 
projects already begun. Quality and variety 
of output in industry is to receive greater 
attention than in the "Leap Forward" era. 
The rate of investment in heavy industry is 
to be reduced so that agriculture, light indus-
try, mining, and transportation can catch 
up. If this policy is carried out, industrial in-
vestment may decline in 1961. 
IV. FUTURE TRENDS 
31. China's progress in overcoming its present 
economic difficulties will be primarily deter-
mined by the vagaries of weather and by 
developments in Sino-Soviet relations. 
Whether or not Soviet technicians return to 
China, we believe that the bitterness of the 
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Sino-Soviet dispute has caused the Chinese 
leaders to place increased importance on 
achieving self-sufficiency. Once having ex-
perienced the disruption caused by a sudden 
withdrawal of Soviet technicians, Peiping is 
unlikely to allow itself to become so dependent 
on them in the future. Recent overtures to 
Italian and other Western European firms to 
send technical specialists to Communist China 
suggest that the Chinese are becoming more 
flexible in their willingness to use Western 
technicians. 
32. China and the USSR are presently en-
gaged in negotiations concerning future trade 
and economic relationships. We are not yet 
able to judge the likely outcome of these 
talks, but we believe that economic coopera-
tion will not be as full as previously. Even 
if Soviet technicians return to China, the 
scope of their activities probably will be less 
than they were prior to mid-1960. In the 
absence of Soviet technicians the Chinese 
probably will concentrate on filling techno-
logical gaps as best they can in fields already 
partly developed-such as metallurgy, chem-
istry, and machine building-at the expense 
of more advanced industries. 
33. While normal crop weather in 1961 would 
significantly improve farm output over the 
levels of 1959 and 1960, at least two years of 
average or better harvests will be required to 
overcome the crisis and permit a restoration 
of the diet to tolerable levels, some rebuilding 
of domestic stocks, and the resumption of net 
food exports. Over the longer term, the re-
gime will be confronted with China's basic 
limitations on agricultural production, and 
will find it difficult to achieve increases in out-
put commensurate with the rate of popula-
tion growth. The regime appears to recog-
nize this fact and to be reshaping its invest-
ment program to provide some additional re-
sources for agricultural development. Al-
though the regime will probably be able to 
secure the minimum essential growth in farm 
output, the margin over requirements will 
remain small owing to the basic aim of maxi-
mizing industrial expansion. In view of the 
vagaries of weather and the likelihood that 
the regime's predilection for "crash" programs 
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will prevent a steady and orderly agricultural 
development, agricultural crises probably will 
recur from time to time. 
34. Communist China's current economic 
problems will also affect the amount and pat-
tern of its foreign trade. Total exports in 
1960 declined by about 10 to 15 percent below 
the high level of 1959 and may decline still 
further in 1961. China probably will be 
forced to request Bloc countries-chiefly the 
USSR-to defer the payments obligations it 
has incurred during recent years. Despite 
the strained relations between China and the 
USSR, we believe that Moscow will at least 
partially accede to such a request. Neverthe-
less, in view of China's reduced export capa-
bilities and the large foodgrain imports from 
the West scheduled for 1961, imports of ma-
chinery and equipment-largely from the 
Bloc-may decline by as much as 30 percent 
compared to 1959 and 1960, and trade with 
the Free World may make up a significantly 
larger proportion of China's total trade. 
35. Under these circumstances in industry, 
agriculture, and Sino-Soviet economic rela-
tions, GNP probably will increase by about 
8 percent annually during the period 1961-
1965-about the rate of increase during the 
First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). On the 
assumption that Soviet technicians in large 
numbers do not return to China, industrial 
production is likely to increase about 12 per-
cent annually, as compared with about 33 per-
cent in 1959 and 16 percent in 1960. Only 
limited progress is likely in the more complex 
branches of industry, which will have a re-
tarding effect on China's ability to produce a 
modern military establishment. 
36. The economic difficulties confronting 
Communist China are unlikely to have a 
marked effect on Peiping's foreign policy. 
We believe that domestic difficulties will not, 
in themselves, either prompt Peiping to under-
take a foreign adventure in order to divert 
domestic discontent or to refrain from such 
an adventure. Nor will present economic 
troubles significantly affect Communist 
China's aid commitments to Free World coun-
tries, since these involve only a minute part 
of Communist China's total output. 
37. Peiping's recent failures, particularly its 
inability to solve the food problem, will almost 
certainly have some limiting effect on the 
impact and attraction of Communist China 
in Asia. Fear of and respect for Communist 
China will continue to be major factors in 
Asian politics. However, there is likely to de-
velop-at least for the next few years-a less 
dazzled view of Communist China's economic 
achievements than has prevailed in recent 
years, especially since other Asian countries, 
such as Japan and India, have made relatively 
good economic progress during recent years. 
V. THE CONTINGENCY OF POOR WEATHER 
IN 1961 
38. Events so far have not been auspicious 
for this year's crops. The 1960 fall sowing 
was affected by drought, late harvest of sum-
mer crops, peasant apathy, and inadequate 
planning. As a result there apparently has 
been a reduction in winter crop acreage and 
generally late plantings. Below normal pre-
cipitation during the winter months in the 
North China plain-the major wheat area-
has not provided favorable growing conditions 
for an area already short of soil moisture. 
However, if rainfall is adequate during the 
critical months of April and May a good wheat 
crop could still result. To date, precipitation 
and growing conditions in the rice producing 
areas of China have been about average. 
39. A poor crop year in 1961, the third con-
secutive such year, would probably prevent 
any increase in GNP. China would be forced 
to reduce future industrial imports even more 
drastically than now appears necessary in 
order to continue or expand food imports. 
If ind us trial crops such as cotton and other 
fibers failed to recover, industry, chiefly light 
industry, would suffer in 1962, and the regime 
would have an extremely difficult time main-
taining even the reduced pace of economic 
expansion it now appears to envisage. 
40. Another poor crop would probably raise 
extremely grave problems for the regime in 
China. Unless there were substantial food 
imports, malnutrition and disease would be-
come widespread and a considerable amount 
-"EC'.RE'f-
OEC:rtET 9 
of starvation would probably result. Party 
cohesion, effectiveness, and morale would drop. 
Public disaffection would probably become a 
major problem for the regime, and active re-
sistance probably would occur, at least on a 
local level. If open resistance became wide-
spread, the leadership would almost certainly 
undertake a massive campaign of threats and 
terror. While the responsiveness and effec-
tiveness of its control apparatus would prob-
ably decline still further, it is unlikely that 
public disaffection would threaten the re-
gime's control of China. Hunger and wide-
scale passive resistance, however, would con-
stitute acute economic and political problems 
for the Chinese Communist Party and 
China's development programs. We do not 
believe that even these difficulties would, in 
themselves, cause Peiping to engage in direct 
military aggression. 
41. These circumstances probably would, how-
ever, prompt Peiping to avoid actions which 
would exacerbate its relations with Moscow. 
While China would be extremely reluctant to 
admit its inability to feed its people, the re-
gime probably would feel it could accept offers 
of food or other aid from another Communist 
country without too great a loss of face. 
Unless there is a further deterioration in Sino-
Soviet relations, we believe that the Soviets 
would provide some assistance in such a time 
of crisis. 
42. The regime has already made it clear that 
it will not accept food offers from the US in 
the present situation, and we believe that it 
will continue to take this position even if the 
1961 crops are poor. The Chinese leaders 
probably will continue to take the line that 
China can overcome the present temporary 
difficulties by its own resources, that there is 
no famine, and that Westerners have, for ul-
terior motives, deliberately exaggerated the 
seriousness of the situation. Their principal 
consideration is, of course, a sense of national 
pride: acceptance of a food off er would be an 
admission that their own program had failed 
in an important respect, and, equally impor-
tant, an acknowledgement that the West is 




0 10{ 40~ 600 Mile~ 
0 r 'J 4' 6 K >meter" 
<.:~ 




FOa O:q;+e)At USE ONLY 
\ 
. . s \ ~ l t!/ "k" u s . ~----., • 7' / liuikul 
_,, -r>.- t:J "o~ ~) 









M ONGOL! A 
/""- ··-,- . 







~m,\. _ __  / 
i 
• , 
(s tatus 1~d1s::wte) 
.. ._ -
T he MAJOR W H EAT AREAS have suffered two consecutive years 
of drought and are experiencing the most serious food shortages. 






Rice -Tea Area : nee , wheat , 
barley , broadbeans, rape· 
seed , tea , sweetpotatoes , 
sugarcane , and cotton 
Yangtze R:ce- Wheat Area 
nee, wheat , soybeans, cot 
ton , sweetpotatoes. barley , 




corn, sweetpotatoes , pea - : ,~: ~ 
Szechwan Rice Area : rice, [TI] 
nuts, kaol1ang, cotton , wheat, • 3 
tobacco, tung 01/ , rapeseed, 
and broadbeans 
Southwestern Rice Area: nee , 
corn, soybeans , millet , pea-
nuts , kao/1ang, broadbeans , 
tung 01/, wheat , and barley 
Double-Cropping Rice Area 
nee , sweetpotatoes , wheat , 
peanuts , sugarcane , fruit , 
tea , and mulberry 
~ 
Spring Wheat Area : wheat, 
millet , oats , peas , potatoes, 
buckwheat, flax , and barley 
Winter Wheat-Millet Area 
wheat, millet, corn , cotton , 
kao/1ang, soybeans, buck -
wheat, rapeseed, peas, and 
ba rley 
Winter Wheat-Kaoliang Area : 
wheat, kaol:ang, soybeans, 
millet, sweetpotatoes, corn, 
cotton , fru:t , and nuts 
OTHER AREAS 
Manchunan Soybean-Kao-
l1ang Area: soybeans , corn , 
kaol1ang , millet , nee , bar-
ley, and wheat 
Sinkiang Oases Area corn , 
wheat , nee , kaol1ang, bar 
/ey . cotton , vegetables, me/· 
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